of recent state and federal consensus policies for the Delta: and fisheries and other instream-protection interests, solution among themselves, rather than imposing one externally, priority to their own objectives rather than broader state or national, objectives, resulting in failure of strategic decision-making, whic, ning with cooperation among upstream, in-Delta, and water export, interests in constructing upstream dams and water export facilities, starting in the 1930s. Also, parties do, not play each game separately, meaning that they do not bar-, gain over water shares in a given time step (say a month) with-, out considering their shares at other times (, Therefore, the bargaining consists of multiple bargaining, linked feasible solutions expand to create the possibility that, to gain in more important time periods, so that all parties might, preferences for water deliveries over time. Dilemma core making cooperation difficult. , Public Policy Institute of California, San Francisco. As feed consumption appears to be a function of water availability, differences in feed conversion efficiency were not statistically significant (P>.05). Decision-making in the context of complex human–natural systems requires a transition towards robust model-based inferences which are effective despite uncertainties of human and climate driven change. (1997). So, it is critical to ask what socio-hydrology has been able to offer that would have been unachievable using the existing methods, tools, and analysis frameworks. The games are simulated between two stakeholders by the graph model conflict resolution (GMCR) method as one of the non-cooperative methods. California; Deltas; Water supply; Ecosystems. California's Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta is the major hub of California's water supply system and is central to the ecosystem of many native threatened and endangered species. This paper traces changes in this conflict in game-theoretic terms, with its implications for the region's physical and ecological decline and governance. The Levee Force Index increases significantly over the next 50 years demonstrating regional increases in the potential for island flooding. The Delta problem has had a Prisoner, within a reasonable time frame. The Sacramento Region's water supply and economy face potential threats from proposals for a Delta solution. but increase in the group size makes the equilibrium Pareto-deficient. Case studies in this special issue document how CALFED helped change the dynamics between stakeholders and agency managers; between scientists and implementers; and between endangered species managers and water project operators. conflict during these periods from a game-theoretic perspective, identifying the structure of the conflict and predicting poss, comes. Upstream and in-, Delta water diversions, water operations, and land use changes have, fish species. Currently, the California Bay-Delta Authority has no overarching policy that addresses the consequences of, and potential responses to, gradual or abrupt landscape change in the Delta. This case study joins research from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta with global discussions about Anthropocene landscapes in general and Anthropocene Deltas in particular, which we understand to be both shaped by people and shaping people. proach for multi-criteria decision making under uncertainty. The yearly amount of salt fluctuates in response to hydrologic conditions within the rivers and Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. (1995). Through engaging with this case study, we expect readers to be able to think about how an evolving Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta exemplifies an Anthropocene landscape and engage with the implications of a pivot away from economic growth and toward sufficiency as a central management objective. Based on continuing increases in the Levee Force Index and the Accommodation Space Index, and limited support for Delta levee upgrades, there will be a tendency for increases in and impacts of island flooding, with escalating costs for repairs. These include a conveyance network for drinking water, a biological network for delta smelt, and a transportation network for roads. Rather than questioning the need for, change, the parties were concerned with the cost of the solution, provide enough water for the hydraulic barrier, upstream diver-, sions, and in-Delta users. “no contribution” is the equilibrium regardless of the group size. If parties know they will, pay according to their benefits, they tend to report low benefits. The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta is the major hub of water supply and is central to the ecosystem of many native threatened and endangered species in California. sarily linear or homogeneous with the received amount of water, the Delta bargaining game is not essentially zero-sum as the, among the players between time steps. s Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta is the major hub of California, s water supply system and is central to the ecosystem of, s physical and ecological decline and governance. Levee Failures in the Sacramento â San Joaquin River Delta: Characteristics and Perspectives. Conflicts over the Delta have evolved over more than a century, this conflict in game-theoretic terms, with its implications, zero-sum problem and win-win resolutions may exist if stakeholders cooperate. of Civil, / JOURNAL OF WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT © ASCE / MARCH/APRIL 2012, s history can be separated into four periods of develop-, . In-Delta users benefitted from, this solution, over the then-status quo, without making major, payments. A strategy is dominant for a given player if, regardless of what, the other players do, the strategy causes higher payoffs for that, player than any other strategy. Since, California has two options, two matrices are needed to represent, the game in a normal form. The linkage of these allocation games (each separately a, creases the possibility of a nonzero solution, where everyone, These allow the Delta bargaining problem to be formulated as, follows on the basis of the extension of the Nash-Harsanyi bargain-, subject to individual rationality and resource availability con-. The SacramentoâSan Joaquin River watershed is Californiaâs largest source of water for farms and urban areas. How much is convenient to defect? (1986). Game theory provides some insights on the potential for win-win solutions. ces of noncooperation unless the Delta collapses. Ap-. Consideration of these methodological constructs clarifies how problems can be perceived and framed in rival decision support paths emerging from the cumulative effects of individual methodological choices and the challenging human factors that shape decision-making under deep uncertainty. Water flows and varied land uses underlie a very â¦ This review plan was developed in accordance with EC 1165-2-209, which establishes an accountable, comprehensive, life â¦ The conference generated a list of suggestions for further action regarding the recognition, preservation, and dissemination of In Sacramento, the least decrease in tidal range between 1939 and the present occurred during spring months, due to the decrease in river discharge during this period. Hipel, K. W., Kilgour, D. M., Fang, L., and Peng, X. Sacramento/San Joaquin Delta. Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, Asymmetric Bargaining Model for Water Resource Allocation over Transboundary Rivers. Public Goods Game, Traveler's Dilemma and War of Attrition. In practice, dozens to potentially thousands of stakeholders, exist; however, the analysis results and the PD aspect of the game, would not change with more players because of symmetry. The focus is nutrients and their effects in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. Farm revenues down just 3 percent due to water losses The most recent estimates of job losses due to cuts in water allocations from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta are far lower than was first predicted, according to an article published last week in the Contra Costa Times. To better manage the Delta, the state, might make parties report their benefits. Game theory; Conflict resolution; Delta; CALFED; California; Chicken; Prisoner, s Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta is the state, s Delta differs greatly from its original 500,000 acres of tidal, s Delta crisis also originates from institutions, man-, Assistant Professor, Dept. of different stakeholders becomes especially important. The individual rationality constraint [Eq. The chicken core, remains present, and the game eventually has winners and losers, or. Turkey has the highest bargaining power in ERB negotiation since it dominates in terms of economic strength, political influence, and military capacity, whereas in the two downstream countries these aspects are limited due to their internal political fragmentation and weaker military status. Cooperation, s Dilemma structure, noncooperation remained. Game theory, win solutions. which would be reduced substantially once agreement has been, made. This report has been prepared in support of the DeltaKeeperâs efforts to improve and protect the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta water quality-beneficial uses. game, only in function of its payoffs. A controversial plan that would put Southern Californiaâs most powerful water agency in control of a group of Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta islands has run into a potentially significant hurdle. The Delta conflict has evolved, over time and the problem structures discussed so far are likely to, collapse of the current system with drastic costs to stakeholders is. If one party decides to cooperate, it takes on more, responsibility for changes and costs for the transition; the other, party then benefits most by not cooperating. tion of power, shipping, and thousands of roads, bridges, homes, and businesses, which can cost tens of billions of dollars (, Corporation and J.R. Benjamin and Associates 2009, warming is leading to higher sea levels and less snow and more, and making flooding more likely. While the Delta game may seem a repeated game in which par-, ties play the same game many times, this game is not considered as, a repeated game in the game theory context. The Delta problem, now has a Chicken game structure, in which Delta failure is the, egies. that is a group size as a cause of suboptimal provision of collective or public goods. 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